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a b s t r a c t
An important principle of humanethics is that individuals arenot responsible for actionsperformedwhen
unconscious. Recent research found that the generation of an action and the building of a conscious expe-
rience of that action (agency) are distinct processes and crucial mechanisms for self-consciousness. Yet,
previous agency studies have focussed on actions of a ﬁnger or hand. Here, we investigate how agents
consciously monitor actions of the entire body in space during locomotion. This was motivated by pre-
vious work revealing that (1) a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness concerns a single and coherent
representation of the entire spatially situated body and (2) clinical instances of human behaviourwithout
consciousness occur in rare neurological conditions such as sleepwalking or epileptic nocturnal wander-
ing. Merging techniques from virtual reality, full-body tracking, and cognitive science of conscious actionotion capture
ensorimotor
leepwalking
monitoring,we report experimental data about consciousness during locomotion in healthy participants.
We ﬁnd that agents consciously monitor the location of their entire body and its locomotion only with
low precision and report that while precision remains low it can be systematically modulated in several
experimental conditions. This shows that conscious action monitoring in locomoting agents can be stud-
ied in a ﬁne-grained manner. We argue that the study of the mechanisms of agency for a person’s full
bodymay help to reﬁne our scientiﬁc criteria of selfhood and discuss sleepwalking and related conditions
as alterations in neural systems encoding motor awareness in walking humans.. Introduction
The generation of a goal-directed action and the building of a
onscious experience thereof have been considered distinct pro-
esses (Castiello, Paulignan, & Jeannerod, 1991) and science has
rovided empirical evidence for such dissociations in neurolog-
cal patients. Seminal hand-pointing studies have revealed that
atients, who cannot visually recognize objects or shapes, can
evertheless accurately direct and orient their hands when reach-
ng towards such objects or shapes (Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, &
arey, 1991); such instances of motor responses to stimuli with-
ut awareness have also beendemonstrated inhealthyparticipants
Bridgemen, Kirch, & Sperling, 1981; Goodale, Pelisson, & Prablanc,
986).
Being aware of the goal of an action or “what” an action is
bout is not the same as being aware of “how” that action was
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performed. Following early work by Nielsen (1963, 1978), this lat-
ter form of conscious action monitoring or motor awareness (MA)
has recently been the topic of intensive research (Fourneret &
Jeannerod, 1998; Franck et al., 2001; Knoblich & Kircher, 2004; van
den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002). In these studies participants’ MA was
measured in response to randomized incongruencies between gen-
erally congruent visual, proprioceptive, and motor signals. These
studies showed that participants automatically aligned their hand
trajectorieswith a visual target on the computer screen,while com-
pensating for a displayed spatial deviation. The participants were
often unaware of their online corrections and judgedmany of these
actions as non-deviated.
These previous investigations of MA were important for the
studyof bodily self-consciousness, butwere focussedon the aware-
ness for actions of ﬁngers, hands, or arms. Yet, a fundamental aspect
of bodily self-consciousness is that the self is experienced as a sin-
gle coherent representation of the entire, spatially situated body,
not as several separate body parts (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009) and
thishas recentlybeen testedexperimentally (Aspell, Lenggenhager,
& Blanke, 2009; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, &
Blanke, 2007). Therefore, previous MA studies did not investigate
this fundamental aspect of the bodily self as the participants’ body
position was kept constant (except for actions of ﬁnger, hand, or
arm). To investigate MA for the entire body we here measured
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A during different displacements of a person’s entire body during
ocomotion. In addition to differences in the involved sensorimo-
or systems, locomotion also gives rise to vestibular sensations and
hanges in the perception of the surrounding extrapersonal space,
iffering fromchangesduring goal-directed armmovements in sta-
le or sitting actors. Striking dissociations between MA and motor
erformance (MP) for the full body, are suggested by anecdotal
linical reports about patients with episodic nocturnal wander-
ng (as in nocturnal frontal lobe epilepsies; Pedley & Guilleminault,
977; Plazzi, Tinuper,Montagna, Provini, & Lugaresi, 1995) or sleep
alking (somnambulism; Broughton, 1968; Gastaut & Broughton,
965). These patients may get up and walk around their house for
everal minutes without consciously monitoring or being able to
ecall what and how it happened (Broughton, 1968; Plazzi et al.,
995). This lack of MA for the entire body leads to distinct clinical,
cientiﬁc, and legal consequences for such patients and is appar-
nt in medical and forensic procedures (Beran, 2002; Mahowald,
undlie, Hurwitz, & Schenck, 1990).
Merging techniques from virtual reality, full-body tracking, and
ognitive science we investigated MA and MP for a person’s entire
ody during locomotion (Fig. 1a). Participants’ movements were
aptured (participant’s body, Fig. 1a) and projected in real-time
nto a virtual body that mimicked the participant’s movements
virtual body, Fig. 1b) while they performed a goal-directed walk-
ng task. During some trials the virtual body’s walking trajectory
as deviated systematically from the participant’s actual walking
rajectory allowingus to generate controlled spatial conﬂicts and to
xperimentally test MA of healthy participants during locomotion.
n study1wetested–basedonvisual-motor conﬂicts–whetherMA
nd MP for the full-body is dependent on the angle of the deviated
alking trajectory. In study 2, we tested (a) whether MP and MA
as tested in study 1) may be further inﬂuenced by the orientation
upright, inverted; i.e. Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003) and
he perspective or walking direction (congruent, incongruent; i.e.
avidet al., 2006;Vogeley&Fink, 2003) asbothmechanisms, inver-
ion and perspective, have shown to inﬂuence the perception of
uman bodies as well as bodily self-consciousness (see also below,
tudy 2).
. Materials and methods
.1. Participants
Nine healthy participants volunteered for study 1 (6 male, 3
emale, mean age=21±3 years), 14 for study 2 (8 male, 6 female,
ean age=25±6 years, height =176±10 cm, weight =69±12kg).
articipants had normal or corrected to normal vision. The two
tudieswere conductedaccording to theprinciples expressed in the
eclaration of Helsinki and accepted by the local ethics commit-
ee (University Hospital, Lausanne, Switzerland). All participants
rovided written informed consent for the collection of data and
ubsequent analysis.
.2. Motion capture
An active optical motion capture system was used for tracking
nd recording the participants’ movements (ReActor2, Ascen-
ion Technology Corp., Burlington, VT, USA). In both studies 20
nfra-red markers were strategically placed on the participants’
ody and major joints. Whole-body motion capture took place
n a 4.11m×4.11m×2.54m (length×width×height) tracking
rena incorporating 448 detectors positioned in the 12bar track-
ng frame. Motion was captured at a sampling frequency of
0Hz.logia 48 (2010) 1628–1636 1629
2.3. Character animation
For 3D character animation a commercial, real-time productiv-
ity suite was used (Autodesk MotionBuilder, San Rafael, CA, USA).
This software facilitated mapping the virtual character used in the
study onto the set of optical markers worn by the participant while
integrating natural biped kinematics. A customized skeleton was
ﬁtted for each participant to align the joints of the virtual char-
acter with the participant’s actual joints. The overall delay of the
system, including data acquisition, character animation, and visual
presentation, was less than 80ms.
2.4. Visual stimuli
Visual stimuli were back-projected onto an area of
3.20m×2.35m (width×height, 1280×1024 pixels, 60Hz),
with the screen itself forming the back-wall of the tracking arena
(JVC DLA-SX21 projector, JVC U.S.A., Wayne, NJ, USA) The dimen-
sions of the virtual room matched those of the tracking arena.
All cameras were adapted (location, ﬁeld-of-view) so the virtual
body had the same proportions as an actual person standing at
the same distance. A custom plug-in controlled the experiment
ﬂow, formats, and saved the position-, timing-, and response data
during the entire study.
2.5. Study 1: Procedure
At thebeginningof the study, participantsweregiven threemin-
utes to adapt to their virtual body in a “free movement” condition.
The virtual room was empty except for the participant’s virtual
body. At this point the participants also had the opportunity to
point out any perceived mismatches between his own and the vir-
tual body’s movements so that these could be corrected. A training
block (20 trials, 5–10min) was run before each of the four main
conditions. The same targets that were used in the main experi-
mentwereusedhere aswell, but only angular deviations of±5◦ and
±20◦. During the training session the participant could ask ques-
tions about the task and was advised to give constant feedback
about his movement and decision.
In each trial of study 1, participants ﬁrst moved the virtual body
to the start location in the virtual room by walking to the corre-
sponding location in the motion capture area. Then, a virtual target
was shown in the virtual room. Its location was randomly selected
from four possible locations and indicated by a transparent cylin-
der (Fig. 1). After the virtual target appeared, the participants were
asked to move their virtual body to the virtual target location by
walking in the motion capture area. In some trials (75%), in ran-
domized order, and beyond a distance of 30 cm from the start
location, the walking trajectory of the virtual body was system-
atically deviated towards either the left or the right (by 5◦, 10◦,
15◦, or 30◦). The deviation of the virtual body was calculated rela-
tive to the straight line between the participants’ current position
and the position of deviation onset. Participants were prevented
from adapting to these angular deviations as their direction and
amplitude was randomized on a trial-by-trial basis in study 1 and
2. We predicted that participants would spontaneously deviate
from the straight walking trajectory that connected the start and
target location in order to move the virtual body to the virtual tar-
get location, as has been shown previously for goal-directed hand
movements (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Nielsen, 1963). A trial
ended with the target cylinder disappearing as soon as the partici-
pant reached the target distance of 180 cm, independent of his/her
ﬁnal position with respect to the virtual target. Each participant
was explicitly instructed to always try to reach the targetwith their
virtual body as accurately as possible. The exact instructions were:
“Move your virtual body directly into the target cylinder, in one,
1630 O.A. Kannape et al. / Neuropsychologia 48 (2010) 1628–1636
Fig. 1. Experimental paradigm and setup. (a) Participants were wearing a suit with 20 active infra-red markers strategically positioned on their joints (not shown). The three-
dimensional positions of these markers were recorded by detectors (black bars), further processed by a motion capture computer and then used for real-time animation of
a virtual body, which was shown from the back in a virtual room (see inset) on a back-projection screen in front of the participant (see Section 2 for details). The target was
represented as a transparent cylinder in the virtual room. Participants were asked to move the virtual body to the target by means of actually walking in the 4.11m×4.11m
sized motion capture area. In each trial, the target was randomly selected form 4 predeﬁned locations, and the visual feedback of the virtual body’s location seen by the
participant was either faithful or systematically deviated towards the left or right as a function of the virtual body’s distance d from the onset of perturbation (30 cm) and
an angle 0≤ ˛ ≤±30 (see Section 2 for details). The ﬁnal location of the participant’s body was expressed using an angle relative to an imaginary straight line towards the
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iarget in order to summarize the compensation of the deviation (Motor Performan
irtual body corresponded to the movement they had just performed (Motor Aware
ocation. In some trials, the visual feedback about the virtual body’s current locatio
solid green line) from a straight line in order to move the virtual body into the targ
mooth movement. Once you reach the cylinder it will turn off, and
question is displayed on the screen saying: ‘Did the movement
hown on the screen correspond to the movement you just per-
ormed?”’ The participant was advised to include the movement
er se (∼kinematics), its direction, and its speed into his/her deci-
ion. A wireless Microsoft XBOX 360 controller was used by the
articipant to start each trial and give the yes/no response.
.6. Analysis
For all experimental conditions we determined three values (as
xplained in detail in the following paragraphs). First,wemeasured
he participants’ walking trajectories and movement endpoints to
uantify MP. Second, we asked participants to indicate their MA
y specifying after each trial whether the movement shown on the
all of the motion capture area corresponded to the movement
heyhad just performed (Franck et al., 2001). Third, the relationship
etween MP (movement endpoint) and MA was quantiﬁed for all
xperimental conditions by calculating a motor awareness index
MAI). This index indicated the likelihood of committing an error
n MA with respect to the actual MP.
.7. Motor performance
MP described the total angle compensated by the participant
aking into account the endpoint of each of their movement trajec-
ories and was measured from the onset of deviation at a distance
f 30 cm to the start location and measured in degree. The mean
osition of the four hip markers was used to analyse all walking
rajectories. Trials that were longer than 10 s in duration and trials
hat were corrupted through marker occlusions were omitted. A
ean trajectory was obtained by taking the arithmetic mean of the
and z coordinates at each sample across all trials with the same
ngular deviation.
.8. Motor awarenessMA was expressed by the number of yes-responses out of all
alid trials. Correct MA or self-attribution was a “yes” response
or undeviated, a “no” response for deviated trials. For analysis by
tself, the50% threshold values (point of subjective ambiguity)wereP). After each trial, participants also indicated as to whether the movement of the
MA). (b) Participants were instructed to move a virtual body from a start to a target
systematically deviated (dotted red line). Participants automatically compensated
ation (dashed gray line).
calculated using the Matlab Psigniﬁt toolbox; with respect to the
Motor Awareness Index, MA was expressed as the percentage of
incorrectly self-attributed, deviated trials.
2.9. Motor awareness index
The MAI was introduced to describe the likelihood of errors
in MA (%self-attribution) with respect to the gain (MP/angular
deviation) for each participant and each condition with an angu-
lar deviation. High values of the MAI reﬂected that participants
were more likely to misattribute the full body action to themselves
(caused by frequent self-attribution errors, a low gain, or a com-
bination of both), whereas low values indicated participants were
less likely to self-attribute these actions. A highMAIwould indicate
that MP and MA may be distinct processes because even a strong
sensorimotor conﬂict (caused by compensating for larger angular
deviations) would not cause participants to not self-attribute. The
MAI was therefore used as a mean to investigate the relationship
between MA and MP and how this changed across different experi-
mental conditions. Thus, the MAI allowed us to determine how the
otherwise inaccessible relationship between the initially presented
angular deviation and the actual motor correction inﬂuenced MA.
The MAI was calculated by taking the ratio of MA and MP
for each deviation angle. MA was expressed in terms of percent
false self-attributions, whereas in order to compare MP to MA, MP
was re-calculated as the relative angular compensation performed
based on the introduced angular deviation. The 0◦ control trials
were hence omitted in this case (please refer to the supplementary
material for further details on MP, MA, and MAI).
2.10. Study 2: Procedure
Motion capture, stimulus animation, procedure, training, and
analysis in study2were the sameas in study1. In study2,we exam-
ined whether bodily constraints such as the congruency between
the orientation and walking direction of the participant’s body and
the orientation and walking direction of the virtual body may alter
full-body MP, MA, and/or MAI (see also below). Orientation and
directionmechanismswere tested bymanipulating the orientation
(depicting thevirtual bodyeitherupright [as in study1]or inverted)
and the direction (depicting the virtual body either in back-view [as
O.A. Kannape et al. / Neuropsycho
Fig. 2. Visual feedback for the four conditions. Examples of the visual feedback
shown to the walking participants on the back-projection screen. In the second
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atudy the virtual body would either be shown upright or inverted. It could further
e shown from the back in congruence with the participant’s actual walking direc-
ion, or from the front. In the latter case the virtual body appeared similar to amirror
mage of the real body heading towards the participant.
n study 1] or in front-view) of the virtual body (Fig. 2) and retest-
ng the same eight angular deviations as in study 1 (we averaged
erformance across the corresponding right and left deviations).
his gave rise to a 2×2×4 factorial design with the factors “direc-
ion”, “orientation”, and “angular deviations” (4 conditions with
eviations). IfMAdecreases for front-views thiswould suggest that
irectional incongruency between the virtual body and the partic-
pant’s body is important in full-body MA as tested here whereas
etter performance for front-view conditions would suggest that
irror expertise may be important in full-body MA. Concerning
rientation and based onprevious data on the so-called body inver-
ioneffect (Reedet al., 2003),wepredicted that full-bodyMAwould
ecrease for inverted bodies. In order to ascertain that there were
o perceptual differences between the different experimental con-
itions the average distance (and size) of the approaching virtual
ody in the front-view condition was designed to be equal to the
istance in the back-view condition (Fig. 2).
There were four main blocks in study 2 which were randomized
or each participant, one condition per block. A main block con-
isted of 88 trials with 8 different angular deviations (±5◦, ±10◦,
15◦, ±30◦) and the 0◦ control trials (25–35min). Each deviation
as used twice at each target resulting in 64 offset trials and 24
rue (0◦ offset) trials. (In study 1, only one main block was run
ith a total of 128 trials of which 96 were deviated, each deviation
ccurred three times at each target, 35–45min.)
. Results
.1. Study 1
.1.1. Motor performance
Fig. 3a shows the walking trajectories of one participant (in
op-view) in the motion capture area from the start location to
ach of the four target locations in trials without angular devia-
ion. All participants showed comparable performance and were
ble to accurately move the virtual body to the virtual target loca-
ions (error: 0.10◦ ±0.31◦, mean± SEM). Correct MA was high and
articipants judged the seen movements of the virtual body as
he movements that they had performed in 92.0 (±2.5)% of tri-
ls. However, in trials with angular deviations, and as reported forlogia 48 (2010) 1628–1636 1631
goal-directed hand movements (Fourneret, Franck, Slachevsky, &
Jeannerod, 2001; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Nielsen, 1963), our
experimental design led participants to change theirwalking direc-
tion (Fig. 3b): walking trajectories were deviated in the direction
opposite to the direction of the angular deviation moving the vir-
tual body towards the virtual target. For subsequent analysis we
rotated each trajectory by the corresponding angle of the target
and averaged the walking trajectories across the four virtual tar-
get locations (Fig. 3c). Fig. 3d illustrates the negative correlation
between the endpoints of the participants’walking trajectories and
the size of the angular deviation added to the virtual body’swalking
trajectory (r2 =0.995, p<0.001). The average gain of MP was 0.41
(±0.07)).
3.1.2. Motor awareness
How is this automatic compensation for the angular deviations
reﬂected in the participants’ motor awareness? MP and MA are
summarized in Fig. 4a showing that errors in MA were common for
trialswith small angular deviations. These deviations of 5◦, 10◦, and
15◦ lead to many erroneous self-attributions (in 29.2–82.9% of all
trials) decreasing in magnitude with increasing angular deviation.
Thus, participants often judged the seen movements of the virtual
body as the movements they had just performed. Such errors were
rare (or absent in some participants) when the angular deviations
were largest (5.6%). The point of subjective ambiguity, that is, the
point at which participants were equally likely to judge the move-
ment of the seen virtual body as themovement they just performed
or not, corresponded to 9.6◦. In other words, the majority of devi-
ated trials below this threshold were judged by participants not
to be deviated indicating that motor control for full body displace-
mentsmayoperatewith decreased and lowMA in these conditions.
3.1.3. Motor awareness index
Fig. 4b illustrates the MAI across all eight tested angular devi-
ation and shows that the highest value was at ±5◦ and ±10◦
corroborating our data on the subjective ambiguity (Fig. 4b) and
suggesting that – as the gain was constant at all tested angular
deviations –the more frequent errors in MA are not due to a lower
gain in MP at angular deviations above 10◦.
3.2. Study 2
MP and MA as tested in study 1 may be inﬂuenced in the highly
trained processing of upright bodies, and it may not transfer to
less trained postures such as inverted bodies that have been shown
to decrease performance in the perception of body postures (Reed
et al., 2003) and biological motion (Cutting, Moore, & Morrison,
1988), aswell as self-attribution of armactions (Knoblich&Kircher,
2004; Knoblich, Stottmeister, & Kircher, 2004). Moreover, perfor-
mance may also be dependent on the perspective (David et al.,
2006; Vogeley & Fink, 2003) or direction from which the virtual
body is shown as MA during goal-directed arm movements has
been shown to decrease if the direction of the virtual arm move-
ment is rotated by 180◦ (van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002). Similar
directional mechanisms have been reported for body ownership
(Tsakiris&Haggard, 2005). Concerning the full body, it hasalsobeen
shown that self-identiﬁcation and self-location can bemanipulated
by visuo-tactile stimulation from a back-view direction (Ehrsson,
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007), although humans are more used
to seeing themselves in front-view due to the common use of mir-
rors.3.2.1. Motor performance
Fig. 5 illustrates MP across all angular deviations for the four
experimental conditions. Our results showed a signiﬁcant orien-
tation×direction interaction (F(1,12) =7.8682, p=0.016), without
1632 O.A. Kannape et al. / Neuropsycho
Fig. 3. Motor Performance. Walking Trajectories (single participant) and Motor
Performance (all participants). (a) Walking trajectories from the start location
towards the 4 predeﬁned target locations in the trials without deviations. The gray
circles indicate the target locations. (b) Walking trajectories towards the targets
in the trialswithdeviationsof thevirtual body location to the left (red lines) and rightlogia 48 (2010) 1628–1636
signiﬁcant main effects for Orientation (F(1,12) =4.1647, p=0.06)
or Direction (F(1,12) =1.4963, p=0.24; Supplementary Table 1).
Further statistical analysis revealed that MP was highest in the
“upright/back” condition differing from MP in the “upright/front”
(p=0.01) and “inverted/back” conditions (p<0.01) (“upright/back”
versus “inverted/front” approached signiﬁcance: p=0.06) (Fig. 6a).
MP (−0.33◦ ±0.31◦) and MA (96.4%±1.42%) in undeviated trials
were comparable between study 1 and 2 (Fig. 6b).
3.2.2. Motor awareness
In study 2, the point of subjective ambiguity for MA in the
“upright/back” condition was 13.8◦ (±0.83◦). This was somewhat
higher than in study 1 and lower than in the remaining three
conditions (15.1–15.8◦). There were no differences in MA across
conditions (all p>0.18; supplementary Table 2).
3.2.3. Motor awareness index
Analysis of the MAI revealed that participants were signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to make self-attribution errors in the inverted
conditions than in the upright ones (main effect of Orientation:
F(1,12) =7.7768; p=0.016; Fig. 6c; supplementary Table 3; post hoc
analysis revealed signiﬁcant differences between “upright/back” –
“inverted/back” and “upright/back” – and “inverted/front” condi-
tions: both p<0.018 (all other p>0.15); supplementary Table 3).
Thismeans larger sensorimotormismatches, inducedby the partic-
ipant’s automatic compensatory movement, were required in the
inverted conditions in order for participants to becomeconscious of
themismatchandadapt theirmovements. Inotherwords, thenum-
ber of errors in MA was higher in the inverted conditions than in
the upright conditions for the same MP and the same sensorimotor
mismatch.
4. Discussion
With the use of virtual reality technology, full-body tracking,
and sensorimotor conﬂicts, we induced changes in MP and MA
of moving agents. This enabled us to quantify the precision with
which an agentmonitors the displacements of his body in extraper-
sonal space. Our ﬁndings show that humans track the position and
locomotion of their body with a surprisingly low accuracy within
a peripersonal space of 10–15◦. This incorrect awareness during
goal-directed locomotion andnavigation – foundunder the present
experimental conditions – suggests that the conscious monitoring
of an agent’s moving body is not reliable and that the generation of
full-body locomotion and the building of a conscious experience of
it are distinct brain processes.
The value of 10–15◦ above which angular biases during loco-
motion were more often correctly perceived than not by our
participants is compatible with earlier work on conscious mon-
itoring of goal-directed hand and arm movements (thresholds
of 6.5–15◦) (Farrer, Franck, Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003; Franck
et al., 2001; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004; Posada, Franck, Augier,
Georgieff, & Jeannerod, 2007; Slachevsky et al., 2001; Synofzik,
Thier, & Lindner, 2006), as is our ﬁnding that correct MA (in tri-
als without angular deviation and in trials with the largest angular
deviations) was high. Our MAI analysis further suggests that the
frequent MA errors are independent from the gain of MP (Fig. 4b).
Importantly, full-body locomotion displaces the entire body of the
(blue lines) for ±30◦ (red/dark-blue), ±15◦(dark-orange/blue), ±10◦
(orange/turquoise) and ±5◦ (yellow/light-blue). (c) Average of all walking
trajectories of this participant (using the same convention as in (a and b)) after
having aligned the individual trajectories towards their respective target location.
(d) Motor Performance for all participants and all 9 angles. Participants did not
compensate entirely for the introduced deviation (gain: 0.41) and the compensation
correlates with the deviation.
O.A. Kannape et al. / Neuropsychologia 48 (2010) 1628–1636 1633
Fig. 4. Motor Performance (MP), Awareness (MA), and Motor Awareness Index (MAI) across participants. (a) The dark bars indicate absolute MP for all trials in terms of the
angle compensated at the trajectory endpoints (see Fig. 1b). Errors in MA (light bars) were common for trials with small angular deviations. Thus, angular deviations between
5 agnitude with increasing angular deviation. MA errors were rare or altogether absent in
s Index across all eight tested angular deviations. MAI was highest at ±5◦ and ±10◦; here
p that monitoring of an agent’s moving body is not reliable and not conscious for angular
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S◦ and 15◦ lead to erroneous self-attributions in 29.2–82.9% of trials, decreasing in m
ome participants when the angular deviations were largest. (b) Motor Awareness
articipants were most likely to make MA errors in relation to their MP, suggesting
eviations below 10◦ (all error bars are SEM).
erson (and the arm and hand as well) giving rise to vestibu-
ar sensations and changes in the perception of the surrounding
xtrapersonal space, in addition to changes in the leg sensorimotor
ystem. This differs from goal-directed arm movements in stable
r sitting actors, where only arm related sensorimotor changes
ccur. Despite the different functional consequences of the move-
ent of a person’s body part or a person’s entire body, the present
xperimental data suggest that humans rely on comparable mech-
nisms formonitoring the action of a single body part (i.e. arm) and
he entire body. Our study therefore extended research on MA to
oving agents using a goal-directed locomotion paradigm which
nabled us to create experimental breaches between a virtual full-
ody movement and a person’s actual full-body movement. The
resentwalking characteristics (such as average andmaximumtra-
ectory deviation) were comparable to those found in more natural
xperimental settings where walking performance is generally not
ested under conditions with angular deviations (Hicheur, Pham,
rechavaleta, Laumond, & Berthoz, 2007). By investigating the
ffects of angular deviations and especially MA measures during
uman locomotion we also extended and utilized techniques that
ave previously been used in virtual reality research for method-
logical purposes (Razzaque et al., 2001) to the investigation of
elf-consciousness in moving human agents.
ig. 5. Motor Performance across conditions and deviations. Motor Performance
MP) is shown for all angular deviations and experimental conditions as indicated by
he small avatars in the top left corner. Participants MP was highest in the “upright
ack” condition (solid black line) for all tested deviations (error bars indicate the
EM).
Fig. 6. Motor Performance and Motor Awareness in Study 2. (a) MP (now averaged
across all tested angles per condition) was signiﬁcantly higher in the “upright back”
condition (black bar) than in the “upright front” condition (bar with black stripes)
and the “inverted back” condition (grey bar). (b) Motor Awareness (MA) thresholds
were lower in the “upright back” condition (black bar) as compared to the other con-
ditions, but this difference did not reach signiﬁcance. (c) TheMotorAwareness Index
(MAI) illustrates that participants were least likely to make MA errors depending on
their MP in the “upright back” condition. We also note that incongruent orientation
(between physical and virtual body) is reﬂected in the MAI. Thus, participants were
signiﬁcantly less likely tomakeMAerrors in the upright conditions (black bars) than
in the inverted conditions (grey bars) (all error bars are SEM).
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That MP and MA for movements of the entire body of an agent
n space are in principle dissociable is suggested by rare and strik-
ng neurological syndromes such as somnambulism (Broughton,
968; Gastaut & Broughton, 1965) and epileptic episodic nocturnal
andering (Pedley & Guilleminault, 1977; Plazzi et al., 1995), but
as to our knowledge never been tested experimentally and never
n healthy participants. An interesting aspect of these neurological
yndromes is the complexity of the behaviours that are carried out
hile patients are unaware ofwhat and how they performed them.
n addition, such patients may be steering their body through a
airly complexenvironment. Complexityofmovementand locomo-
ion inhumans are often regarded as indicators to consider an agent
s conscious and are key constituents of selfhood clinically, philo-
ophically, and legally (Beran, 2002; Broughton, 1968; Mahowald
t al., 1990; Pedley & Guilleminault, 1977; Revonsuo et al., 2000).
onscious human agents have been contrasted with the “zombie”
f philosophy and neuropsychology (Koch & Crick, 2001; Revonsuo
t al., 2000), which is often deﬁned as an agent who moves through
he environment without conscious control. We note that such a
ack of conscious control during locomotion is a crucial difference
ith respect to the lack of conscious control for armor hand actions
Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Franck et al., 2001; Nielsen, 1963).
n this latter case awareness is lacking for the movement of a cer-
ain body part of the agent, but the agent remains conscious of the
osition and locomotion of his entire body and hence preserves
elfhood. The present procedure allowedus tomanipulate selfhood
nd showed that the central mechanisms of MA for an agent’s body
arts and the entire agent’s body are similar, despite their different
unctional consequences concerning selfhood (Blanke&Metzinger,
009).
Anecdotal neuroimaging observations in patients with sleep-
alking (Broughton, 1968; Gastaut & Broughton, 1965) and
octurnal frontal lobe epilepsy (without deambulation; Pedley &
uilleminault, 1977; Plazzi et al., 1995) implicated the medial
refrontal cortex (including supplementary motor area and the
nterior cingulate cortex) in the lack of conscious control during
ocomotion in humans. Unfortunately, the neuroscience and neu-
oimaging of upright gait is hampered by two main caveats. First,
euroimaging using fMRI, MEG, or EEG is currently not available
r severely limited in walking humans, although a few research
roups have employed SPECT (Fukuyama et al., 1997) and NIRS
Miyai et al., 2001; Suzuki et al., 2004). These researchers reported
n involvement of medial prefrontal cortex, primary sensorimo-
or cortex as well as lateral premotor and prefrontal cortex during
alking in humans. Second, only humans are truly uprightwalking
rimates. Theneuroscience ofwalking is thus almost entirely based
n ﬁndings in quadrupeds and behavioural work in patients with
ait disorders pointing to a distributed network including a large
etwork of cortical regions, such as the sensorimotor cortex, pre-
otor cortex, and posterior parietal cortex, but mostly subcortical
egions such as spinal cord, brainstem, basal ganglia, cerebellum
Armstrong, 1988; Drew, Prentice, & Schepens, 2004; Grillner &
allen, 1985; Nutt, Marsden, & Thompson, 1993). The sparse clin-
cal data and neuroimaging data point towards the medial walls
f prefrontal and premotor cortex in MA and MP in locomotion,
ut this important question remains to be studied experimen-
ally.
Study 2 conﬁrmed our ﬁndings of study 1 in a different par-
icipant sample by showing that MA for the full body depends
n angular deviation. In study 2 we tested whether MP and MA
re inﬂuenced by the highly trained processing of upright bodies
nd whether these effects transfer to less trained postures such
s inverted bodies. Previous work has shown that inverted bodies
ecrease performance in the perception of body postures (Reed et
l., 2003) and biological motion (Cutting et al., 1988), as well as
n the self-attribution of arm actions (Knoblich & Kircher, 2004;logia 48 (2010) 1628–1636
Knoblich et al., 2004). Secondly, we tested whether performance
also dependent on the perspective (David et al., 2006; Vogeley
& Fink, 2003) or direction from which the virtual body is shown
during locomotion. Again, previous work had shown that MA for
goal-directed arm movements decreases if the direction of the
shown virtual armmovement (shown duringmovement execution
via a computer screen) is rotatedby180◦ with respect to theunseen
goal-directed arm movement (van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002).
Similar directional mechanisms have also been reported for the
related sense of body ownership for the upper extremity (Tsakiris &
Haggard, 2005). Directional visuo-motor incongruencies thus seem
to impair MA during goal-directed arm movements. Yet, this may
be different for full body movements, as humans are more used
to seeing themselves in front-view (directional incongruency) due
to the common use of mirrors and not in back-view (directional
congruency). Thus, in study 2 we manipulated the spatial relation-
ship between the participant’s body and the virtual body in order
to investigate the role of direction and orientation on MP, MA, and
MAI.
Our data show that while MA was not directly inﬂuenced by
orientation and directionMPwas inﬂuenced, as speciﬁcally charac-
terized by highest gains in the upright-back condition.MAI analysis
revealed that the actual angular displacement that resulted from
the MP in each experimental condition (during locomotion) did
affect MA. Yet, such effects on MA were only observed for inverted
virtual bodies leading to higher MAI values. The present data
show that larger sensorimotor mismatches were necessary in the
inverted conditions before participants became aware of them. The
number of errors in MA was higher in the inverted conditions than
in the upright conditions, although MP was similar. These results
were not reﬂected in MA thresholds as these did not take into
account the inﬂuence of the ongoing MP. Thus, through incongru-
ent orientation or inversion between the participant’s body and
the virtual body we can induce further decreases in MA (reﬂected
in an increased MAI). This suggests that the perception of one’s
own full body movement under the present experimental condi-
tions depends on orientation as has been shown for the perception
of body postures (Reed et al., 2003), biological motion (Cutting et
al., 1988), and arm actions (Knoblich & Kircher, 2004; Knoblich et
al., 2004). Incongruency per se (between the participant’s body and
the virtual body) does not lead to decreases in MA, as directional
incongruency was not associated with signiﬁcant decreases in MA.
The similar performance between back-view and front-view vir-
tual bodies (with respect to the participant’s body) may be due to
the frequent mirror exposure of humans.
The present experimental data on MA and agency for full-body
locomotion and navigation complement recent experimental data
(Aspell et al., 2009; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Mouthon, &
Blanke, 2009; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008)
and clinical data (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004; Blanke &
Metzinger, 2009) on the related sense of full-body ownership and
self-location. Based on these previous data it has been argued that a
fundamental aspect of bodily self-consciousness and selfhood is its
association with a single, whole body, not with multiple body parts
as mostly investigated in studies on agency (as discussed above),
but also in studies on body ownership (for discussion see Blanke
& Metzinger, 2009). Thus, a number of recent studies (Aspell et al.,
2009; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2009; Lenggenhager et
al., 2007; Mizumoto & Ishikawa, 2005; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008)
demonstrated that more global aspects of bodily experience (such
as full-body body ownership and self-location) can be experimen-
tally manipulated using multisensory conﬂicts. The present study
used sensorimotor conﬂicts to study full-body agency and there-
fore complements this previous work on the multisensory aspects
of selfhood. We also note that these experimental studies on full-
body ownership and self-location were inspired by an unusual and
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evealing set of neurological phenomena – autoscopic phenomena
in which the sense of the body as a whole can be disrupted in
ifferent ways, and which are likely to be caused by an underly-
ng abnormality in the multisensory integration of full-body bodily
nputs (Blanke et al., 2004, 2005; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). It may
e interesting for future studies to investigate how the neurobi-
logical mechanisms of full-body agency and full-body ownership
verlap and differwith respect to those concerning body parts such
s the upper extremity.
In conclusion, our data reveal the limits of consciousness for
he position of the body and locomotion, allowing us to experi-
entally investigate themechanisms of selfhood inmoving agents.
e show that the control of full-body locomotion and the building
f a conscious experience of it are at least partially distinct brain
rocesses. Under certain experimental conditions healthy human
gents behave “zombie-like” or like sleepwalkers, that is, are not
onitoring correctly (or only with low precision) the movement
nd position of their body in space. This low precision may actu-
lly be an advantage in everyday life. William James mentioned
hat we perform worse when consciously descending a staircase
tep by step. Similarly, during locomotion humans may not be pre-
isely aware of their location and movement in space so that the
rain can deal with a number of situations automatically and often
ven betterwithout awareness. Only if errors pass a certain thresh-
ld – here of 10–15◦ – do humans become conscious and walking
arameters may be adapted through conscious control. We argue
hat thesemechanismsmaybe abnormal in patientswith somnam-
ulism and epileptic episodic nocturnal wandering and that their
urther study may help to reﬁne our scientiﬁc and legal criteria of
elfhood.
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